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Abstract
The paper presents a model of student migration in order to determine
the optimal choice of non-resident tuition fees in a host country of higher
education. Students with rational expectations consider a potential return
migration in their ﬁrst-round decision whether to study abroad, so that
demand for the higher-education system in the host country and optimal
non-resident tuition fees depend on the stay rates of foreign-born graduates.
A decline in stay rates of foreign students is demonstrated to induce a cutback
of tuition fees if the costs of education per student are not too high. The
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graduation in their ﬁrst-stage location decision in combination with rational
expectations ﬁnally drives this result.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The economic globalization rooted in the late 19th, early 20th century, brought a
considerable integration of the world economy, not only in the sense of international
ﬂows of traded goods, services and capital, but also international migration ﬂows.
Back in the mid 1960s and 70s, the ﬁrst contributions analyzing the economic ef-
fects of (especially high-skilled) labor migration on the host and sending countries
of human capital ﬂows emerged (e.g. Grubel and Scott, 1966, 1968; Aitken, 1968;
Raymond, 1973; Bhagwati and Dellalfar, 1973; Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974, Bhag-
wati, 1976). These early papers constituted a strand of the literature often referred
to as the ‘brain-drain literature’, highlighting various issues related to the question
which regions beneﬁt and which regions loose from these human capital ﬂows (of-
ten in asymmetric settings with a developing and a rich country, e.g. Stark et al.,
1997, 1998; Beine et al., 2001; Stark, 2004; Docquier and Rapoport, 2007) and try-
ing to measure the actual brain brain (e.g. Carrington and Detragiache, 1998, 1999;
Straubhaar, 2000; EEAG, 2003; Becker et al., 2004).
Countries are supposed to gain from the immigration of highly-skilled workers, so
that they apply various strategies to attract those workers, for example by means of
ﬁscal incentives (see CESifo, 2005), active immigration policies (like special job fairs,
multilingual employment-oﬀer portals and assistance in administrative procedures
2during and after entry; see Chaloﬀ and Lemaitre, 2009) and ‘liberal’ immigration
regulations. A further way to recruit high-skilled human capital – an this is what the
present paper focuses on – is to attract foreign students and try to retain them in
the country after they have graduated from university. Leaving the domestic higher
education system, they are not only highly skilled but at the same time they can
be easily integrated as they are also provided with country-speciﬁc human capital,
usually have some good language proﬁciency and are familiar with the culture of
the host country etc. The international mobility of students increased considerably
over the last few decades (OECD, 2008a) and“[students], especially from developing
countries, often stay on in OECD countries for further research or employment and
contribute to innovation in these countries” (OECD, 2008b, pp. 83-84). Estimates
for stay rates of foreign students within the U.S. are between one ﬁfth (Rosenzweig,
2006, p. 24) and one third (Lowell et al., 2007, p. 45) or rather even about two thirds
of foreign citizens who received a science or engineering doctorate in the U.S. (Finn,
2003, p. 5). For Germany, Hein and Plesch (2008, p. 11) report a stay rate of 35
percent of foreign students who participated in a special scholarship program. The
host countries of foreign students (the U.S., the UK, Germany and France are the
most important ones, together hosting about 50 percent of all international students
worldwide) seem to be quite aware of the education of foreign students being a
channel of recruiting high-skilled human capital, given their eﬀorts to promote access
of foreign students to the labor market, once they are graduated (see e.g. Tremblay,
2005; OECD, 2008b, Ch. 4; Chaloﬀ and Lemaitre, 2009).
Finally, not only the recruitment issue plays a role when evaluating the eﬀect of
educating foreign students on the host country, but also things like the compensa-
tion of potentially lacking demand for the higher education system from domestic
students, economies of scale in the education system, a promotion of diversity and
creativity on campus, increased R&D activities, cheap foreign labor for the insti-
tutions (in labs, as TA’s or as support of research activities) and the reliance on
tuition-fee revenues from foreign students. Especially the latter aspect is quite in-
teresting, because host countries face a trade-oﬀ here between raising revenues and
3charging reasonable fees in order to attract foreign students, or at least not to deter
them from immigration.
1.2 Purpose of the paper
The present paper analyzes a very speciﬁc aspect against the background of the
ongoing internationalization of higher education, namely how the optimal choice of
non-resident tuition fees changes with declining stay rates of foreign students in the
host country after graduation. The very ﬁrst intuition that fees will have to rise
is usually based on a ﬁxed-budget argument: the lower the proportion of foreign
students staying in the host country after graduation as high-skilled human capital,
the lower the beneﬁt for the host country from educating foreign students. As a
consequence, in order to cover costs per student, tuition fees have to rise. This view,
however, appears by far too narrow: (i) a more appropriate way to describe the host
country’s behavior is to think of tuition fees which are set to maximize some net-
beneﬁt from educating foreign students, instead of balancing a ﬁxed budget; (ii) the
optimal tuition policy has to consider that the number of foreign students depends
negatively on the level of fees; (iii) the demand of foreign students might depend on
the expected probability of staying in the host country after graduation. Especially
the third point takes center stage in the present paper, because it is usually ignored in
migration theory and because it plays an important role for the question with respect
to the choice of non-resident tuition fees: depending on what exactly causes the
return migration of foreign students upon graduation, a higher probability of return
should have an impact on rational students’ ﬁrst-stage decision whether to study
abroad or not. A change in demand for the education system in the host country,
in turn, should also inﬂuence the optimal choice of tuition fees. The theoretical
migration literature usually treats migration decisions at various stages separately
and analyzes either determinants of (ﬁrst-time) emigration or determinants of return
migration, ignoring that the perception of chances/preferences to stay abroad might
aﬀect the ﬁrst-round emigration decision.
4The student-migration model derived in the main part of the paper shows that
an increased return probability of foreign students decreases the demand for educa-
tion abroad and increases the sensitivity of demand to marginal changes in tuition
fees. The higher return rates can be either due to some exogenous event (either in
the host country or the country of origin, forcing the student to return no mat-
ter whether he actually would like to stay or not) or by a higher probability that
a student ex ante overstates the positive value of the lifestyle abroad, causing re-
turn migration due to unmet expectations. In both cases, an increase in the return
probability implies a reduction in the expected individual beneﬁt from staying in
the host country upon graduation and therefore reduces the demand for education
abroad. As a consequence, when adjusting non-resident tuition fees as a response to
the declining stay rate of foreign students, the host country has to tradeoﬀ a behav-
ioral eﬀect (i.e. the eﬀect caused by the changing student migration behavior) which
provides an incentive to decrease tuition fees against the incentive to increase them
due to the reduced loss of a marginal increase in fees from deterring foreign students
from immigration. When the cost of education per student in the host country is not
too large, the behavioral eﬀect becomes particularly important and the host country
cuts down on non-resident tuition fees when students’ stay rates decline.
The migration model and the choice of non-resident tuition fees is analyzed in a
two-country setting: a developed country (‘DC’, e.g. the UK) hosts foreign students
from a less-developed country (‘LDC’, e.g. China, India). As already stated earlier,
it is only a small number of large/rich OECD countries which host a majority of
international students. While Asia is the leading region of origin of international
students, France, Germany, Japan and Korea are the largest single sending-countries.
Students from China and India represent by far the largest group of foreign students
in OECD countries from non-OECD countries (OECD, 2008b, Ch. 3).
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 presents a ﬁrst look on the
problem of choosing optimal non-resident tuition fees and highlights the inﬂuence of
foresighted student-migration behavior. Section 3 derives the student-migration and
return-migration model (3.1) and analyzes the optimal adjustment of tuition fees
5when the stay rates of foreign students in the host country decline (3.2). A special
case of ‘irrational’ students, who believe that they can stay in the host country for
sure and that their positive expectations about foreign lifestyle will certainly come
true, is presented as a benchmark in 3.3, in order to highlight the relevance of the
consideration of the behavioral eﬀect in the student migration decision when re-
turn probabilities change. Section 4 brieﬂy discusses the monopoly assumption with
respect to the supply of higher education (4.1) and presents an extension consid-
ering the composition of the pool of international students (4.2), before section 5
concludes.
2 Choice of non-resident tuition fees: a ﬁrst look
Suppose the host country faces a demand (in terms of the number of foreign stu-
dents) of S = S(f,p), where f denotes tuition fees and p the probability that a
foreign student stays in the host country after graduating from university. The term
‘tuition fees’ is used in a very conceptional way in this paper and is not necessarily
to be taken literally. While it appears justiﬁable to think of a country/region or
rather the government setting tuition fees in public higher education systems (like
in some European countries), a more diﬀerentiated view would be needed for coun-
tries where also private institutions play an important role in the higher education
sector (like e.g., in the U.S. where tuition fees are set in a highly decentralized way
in a mixed public/private setting). One might argue, however, that the government
(for example at the state/province level) could still inﬂuence the price to be payed
by students for example by providing scholarships or certain subsidies in cash or
kind. In the simpliﬁed setting of the model presented here, the host country simply
determines kind of a net-price for education, meaning tuition fees net of various
subsidies and grants. Furthermore, I assume that foreigners can only work in the
DC upon graduation with a domestic university degree, i.e. immigration of workers
who earned a degree in their home country (LDC) is ignored. The host country




c + f + δGpπ
g)S(f,p), (1)
where πc denotes a net-measure of costs and beneﬁts per student to the host coun-
try during the education period (πc could in principle be positive or negative; the
cost side ﬁrst and foremost includes resource costs, while the beneﬁt side could in-
clude peer eﬀects, cultural spillovers or economies of scale within institutions) and
πg > 0 denotes the beneﬁt from retaining foreign students as high-skilled human
capital after graduation (this could again include some positive externalities, posi-
tive net-contributions to the host country’s social security system or above-average
tax payments when the graduates are high-income earners). The government dis-
counts the expected future beneﬁts by the factor δG < 1. The ﬁrst order condition
for the optimal tuition fee is
∂Π
∂f
= S + (π





The eﬀect of a marginal increase of tuition fees on the number of students is supposed
to be negative (∂S/∂f < 0). Survey data suggests for example that the (high) cost
of U.S. tuition is the main reason why international students abstain from studying
in the U.S. (Lowell et al., 2007, pp. 37-38). The optimal fee can be expressed by





where  = ∂S
∂f
f
S < 0. Ignoring the expected beneﬁts accruing in the host country from
retaining foreign students after graduation, the optimal tuition fee policy actually
comes up to a standard monopoly price setting when πc < 0: the host country
charges a price in excess of the marginal cost of providing education and the higher
the country’s monopoly power (as represented by the absolute value of 1/, which at
f = argmaxΠ(f) equals the well-known ‘Lerner index’ of monopoly power or rather
the price-cost margin), the higher tuition fees. Taking into account expected future
beneﬁts pπg per foreign student trained in the host country, a higher price elasticity
7of demand for the education system also provides an incentive to cutback tuition
fees in order to attract foreign students and realize those beneﬁts. The overall eﬀect
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The main focus of the paper is however not so much on the optimal tuition fee
per se, but rather the eﬀect of a decline in the stay rate of foreign students in the
host country after graduation on the optimal non-resident fees. From the ﬁrst order
condition (2) one can derive the eﬀect of the students’ stay rate p on the optimal




















where Σ := 2(∂S/∂f) + (πc + f + δGpπg)(∂2S/∂f2) has to be negative from the
second order condition. A priori, the sign of df/dp is ambiguous. The reason is
that the number of students is assumed to depend on the stay rate p. Suppose
S would only depend on the level of tuition fees f, i.e. S = S(f), then df/dp =
−[δGπg(∂S/∂f)]/Σ < 0. The lower the stay rate p, the lower the marginal loss from
raising tuition fees due to the reduced number of students and therefore the higher
optimal tuition fees. However, and this is my main point here, this view seems to
be too narrow. Students who think of whether to study abroad or in their home
country should (and probably do) consider the possibility of returning to their home
country after having studied abroad.
3 A student migration model and the choice of
non-resident tuition fees
A more thorough analysis of the question how the host country should adjust non-
resident tuition fees when a higher proportion of foreign students tends to return
to their home countries should consider (i) why students return and (ii) how this
aﬀects students’ decision whether to study abroad. Furthermore, the composition
8of the group of students who potentially end up studying in the DC can play an
important role (as I demonstrate in section 4.2) after presenting a speciﬁc student-
migration and return-migration model and analyzing the optimal tuition-fee problem
again.
3.1 Student immigration and return
The following section introduces a student-migration model in order to come up with
a more precise prediction with respect to the sign of (5) from the very conceptional
model above.
Various factors can inﬂuence an individual’s decision in the LDC whether to
study abroad. First of all, assume that the return to education as realized after
graduation is higher when the student studied abroad: while a student gets a return
to education v when he studies in his home country and works there afterwards, he
gets vH > v when working in his home country after having graduated from the
foreign university. This implies that in general, all the students potentially want to
study abroad. However, while the education is assumed to be for free in the home
country, students have to pay fees f abroad. The ‘pure’ return to being educated in
the DC is assumed to be the same both in the host country and the home country
of students. This assumption is mainly made for convenience and is not crucial for
the main results. The more classical brain drain literature usually simply assumes
that there is a wage diﬀerential between the DC and the LDC. However, it is not
only wage rates that matter, but of course also the general price level. Furthermore,
given that Chinese and Indian students for example have excellent career chances
within their home countries with a foreign university degree and some international
experience (Baruch et al., 2007) which should allow them a good standard of living,
this assumption also appears reasonable. Beside the pure living standard in terms
of earnings and career chances, there is usually a further motive for emigration,
namely a preference for the (western) lifestyle in the DC. While the lifestyle in the
DC is a ‘pull-factor’ of migration, some characteristics of the LDC can be thought
9of as ‘push-factors’: “[...] migration is not necessarily induced by economic reasons
of self-advancement to which one may attach low weight; [...] in fact, a substan-
tial part of migration may be induced by ‘non-economic’ reasons, including polit-
ical diﬃculties and personal problems arising from the inevitable tension between
traditional societal laws and institutions in LDC’s and the aspirations and needs
of the ‘modernized’ professional classes” (Bhagwati and Dellalfar, 1973, p. 95). To
some extent push- and pull-factors are two sides to a coin here. Therefore, I assume
some diﬀerence of quality-of-life between the host and the home country, denoted
by ∆v = vF −vH > 0, which is subjectively valued by individuals who are heteroge-
nous with respect to the weight θ ∈ [0,θ] which they attach to this quality-of-life
diﬀerence.
The country-speciﬁc preference which is represented by θ∆v plays an important
role in the student-migration decision, especially with regard to individuals’ eval-
uation of the cost/beneﬁt of returning to the home country after graduation. The
present section considers two reasons why a foreign student returns: (i) he has to
return for some exogenous reason, for example, because he does not get a work per-
mit, he fails to ﬁnd a job at the foreign labor market, or for some reasons within
the country of origin (has to take care for sick relatives etc.); (ii) he wants to re-
turn because he realizes a mistake with respect to expectations about the foreign
lifestyle advantage ∆v. Figure 2 helps to illustrate the return-migration pattern in
the model.
Only after having ﬁnished their studies, foreign students learn whether they are
allowed/able to stay in the host country; the corresponding probability is denoted by
p. With probability x the students’ ex ante valuation of the quality-of-life-diﬀerence
θ∆v turns out to be correct. Therefore, they stay in the host country and ‘consume’
the extra utility θ∆v. With probability (1−x) they realize that their expectations do
not come true (the country-speciﬁc preference for the host country vanishes in that
case), and they return to their home country and earn vH there. With probability
(1−p) the individual has to return to his home country for some exogenous reason.
If he belongs to the group of graduates who changed their mind about the foreign
10Figure 1: Preference for western lifestyle: stay versus return
lifestyle anyway (the probability of belonging to this group is (1−x)) and therefore
want to return, he does not incur any utility loss but simply gets vH in the home
country. Things are diﬀerent, however, for individuals who still have a preference for
the foreign lifestyle (with probability x their expectations come true) and are forced
to return to the poor region. I assume those individuals to incur a utility loss θ∆v
which reﬂects mainly the psychic cost related to the involuntary migration (e.g., in
form of a reverse culture-shock).
When deciding whether to study abroad, students cannot be sure to which of
the groups (i.e. those who are allowed to stay versus those who have to return
for some exogenous reason and those who ﬁnd their positive expectations about the
foreign lifestyle coming true versus those who realize that they overstated the lifestyle
abroad ex ante), so that they have to build expectations based on probabilities p
and x. Their expected (extra) beneﬁt from having the option to stay in the DC
after studying abroad is [p(xθ∆v + 0) + (1 − p)(−xθ∆v + 0)] = θx(2p − 1)∆v. In
what follows, I assume p ∈ (1/2,1] and x ∈ (0,1] so that the expected beneﬁt is
strictly positive. Please note that the stay rate of students ﬁnally is p × x. The
assumption that p ≥ 1/2 is therefore not too restrictive, as overall stay rates could
still fall short of 50 percent. Therefore the migration model is very well consistent
with stay rates smaller than 1/2 as for example reported by Rosenzweig (2006) and
11Lowell et al. (2007) for the U.S. or Hein and Plesch (2008) for Germany. In order to
keep things simple in this analysis, graduates who stay on in the host country upon
graduation are assumed to do so for the rest of their life. While this assumption is
not fully realistic because some people may want to return to their home countries
once they have accumulated a certain amount of wealth, the model abstains from
introducing an endogenous timing of return migration at some point in time during
the working life of a high-skilled worker (like e.g., in Dustmann, 2003; Dustmann and
Weiss, 2007), because the present paper focusses on the eﬀects of (enforced or rather
voluntary) return migration immediately after graduation. The main intuition for
the results would not change qualitatively at the presence of an additional return-
migration decision at a later date.
The student-migration behavior can then be depicted by the following indiﬀer-
ence condition:
δI[v
H + ˆ θx(2p − 1)∆v] − f = δIv. (6)
A student is exactly indiﬀerent between studying at home and studying abroad when
the discounted net-beneﬁt from studying abroad (i.e. the return to foreign studies
plus the expected extra beneﬁt from consumption of the foreign lifestyle net of tuition
fees) equals the discounted reservation utility δIv which he gets from studying and
working in his home country. An implicit assumption with respect to the migration
model as presented by indiﬀerence condition (6) is that foreign students can always
aﬀord the non-resident tuition fees in the DC. This means that either their initial
endowment is already suﬃciently high or that there are no credit constraints and
the direct return to education (i.e. vH − v) always exceeds the individual expenses
for the tuition fee. Furthermore, diﬀerences in the consumption value of education or
rather the value of ‘college life’ between the two regions are ignored. The individual
discount factor applied to beneﬁts accruing in the working period is δI < 1 for
all students. All students with a valuation of the foreign lifestyle θ ≥ ˆ θ will study
abroad, while those with a lower valuation stay on in their home country. With
the overall size of the student body which is eligible for education in the DC being





dF(θ) = 1 − F(ˆ θ),
where F(θ) is the cumulative distribution function of θ and the cut-oﬀ valuation of
western lifestyle is
ˆ θ =
v − vH + f/δI
x(2p − 1)∆v
(7)
by indiﬀerence condition (6). In order to be able to derive the optimal tuition fee in
the next step explicitly, θ is assumed to be uniformly distributed among the foreign
student body over the interval [0,θ], so that
S = 1 −
[v − vH + f/δI]
θx(2p − 1)∆v
. (8)
The demand of students for the education system in the DC depends negatively
on tuition fees, positively on the probability of being allowed to stay in the host
country after graduation and positively on the probability of ﬁnding one’s positive
















v − vH + f/δI
θx2(2p − 1)∆v
> 0.
Technically, the positive signs for ∂S/∂p and ∂S/∂x follow from the constraint S < 1,
which requires [v − vH + f/δI] > 0. The intuition is moreover straightforward:
since the expected consumption value of the western lifestyle increases both in a
student’s possibility to stay in the host country and the probability that the positive
expectations about the foreign lifestyle come true, the demand for education in the
rich country increases in p and x.
133.2 Choice of tuition fees





c + f + δGpxπ
g)S(f,p,x) s.t. S(f,p,x) ∈ (0,1). (9)
The ﬁrst order condition for the optimal non-resident tuition fee, using the education





[v − vH + f/δI]
θx(2p − 1)∆v
−
(πc + f + δGpxπg)
δIθx(2p − 1)∆v
= 0, (10)
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The restriction on the parameter range for the stay rate, p ∈ (1/2,1], ensures the
second order condition for a maximum to hold. A decline in the percentage of foreign
students staying in the host country can be due to a decline in p or in x. Tuition




















The direction of both adjustments is a priori ambiguous. As already argued on the
basis of the more conceptional version of the model in section 2, diﬀerent return-
migration patterns of graduates aﬀect both the beneﬁts of the host country from
educating foreign students, but also the students’ migration behavior. Both aspects
have to be considered in the decision on the optimal tuition fee policy. First of all,
the lower the stay rate of graduates (i.e. the lower px), ceteris paribus, the lower
the marginal cost of raising tuition fees due to the fee’s deterrent eﬀect on the
number of foreign students and therefore the higher the non-resident fee. This eﬀect
is in each case represented by the second term in brackets in equations (12) and
14(13). Second, the expected stay rate aﬀects the student-migration pattern: (i) the
lower the expected stay rate, the lower total demand S and therefore, the lower the
marginal beneﬁt from raising tuition fees (the idea goes along with the argument that
a smaller tax base implies a smaller marginal beneﬁt from increasing the tax rate);
(ii) the lower the expected stay rate, the higher the absolute value of the sensitivity
of demand to tuition fees, i.e. ∂(|∂S/∂f|)/∂ρ < 0, ρ ∈ {p,x}, and therefore the
higher the marginal cost of rasing tuition fees. The corresponding (combined) eﬀect
which implies an incentive to cutback tuition fees is represented in both cases by
the ﬁrst term in brackets in (12) and (13). I might refer to the latter eﬀects as the
‘behavioral eﬀects’, which are directly opposed to the more direct ‘revenue eﬀects’.
The behavioral eﬀects become more relevant the larger the diﬀerence in the quality
of life for high-skilled individuals between the host and the sending country (as
represented by ∆v) and the larger the heterogeneity of students with respect to the
ex ante valuation of the western lifestyle (as represented by θ). The diﬀerence in
the validation of expected beneﬁts in the future from the individual perspective and
the host-country perspective also plays a role: the higher the importance of future
payoﬀs for individuals’ utility relative to the importance to governments’ objectives
(i.e. the larger δI relative to δG), the larger are the behavioral eﬀects relative to the
revenue eﬀects in both (12) and (13) and therefore the more likely is a decline in
tuition fees when stay rates of foreign students decrease.
The overall signs of df/dp and df/dx ﬁnally depend on the relative size of the
parameter values in the model. Taking into account that the set of parameters has
to ensure that the constraint S(f,p,x) ∈ (0,1) is met given the optimal choice of
tuition fees, however, one can at least come up with the following insight: if the
cost of education per student in the host country is not too large or if the host
country’s education system even observes a net-beneﬁt (πc > 0) from educating
foreign students, the eﬀect of a declining stay rate of students in the host country
on non-resident tuition fees can be unambiguously signed. The following proposition
states that more precisely:
15Proposition 1 δI(vH − v) > −πc is a suﬃcient condition for the non-resident
tuition fees to decrease if the stay rate of foreign students (from an LDC) in the
host country (DC) upon graduation declines, i.e. df/dp > 0 and df/dx > 0.
Proof Please refer to the Appendix.
Verbally, δI(vH −v) > −πc means that the individual (discounted) direct return
to education in the foreign country has to exceed the cost of education per student.
This of course also includes cases where πc ≥ 0, saying that the host country actually
already beneﬁts from the education of foreign students during the education period
and not only when they stay within the country as high-skilled workers.
The analysis in this section makes clear that the consideration of the adjustment
of students’ migration behavior when the return-migration pattern upon graduation
changes is crucial for the optimal adjustment of non-resident tuition fees. Given that
the condition in Proposition 1 holds, the behavioral eﬀects will dominate the revenue
eﬀects, and therefore a decline in the stay rate of foreign students induces a decline
in tuition fees. For all other cases, the overall signs of df/dp and df/dx depend on the
relative size of the other parameters in the model, as explained above. The condition
δI(vH − v) > −πc is a suﬃcient but not a necessary condition for df/dp > 0 and
df/dx > 0.
3.3 Special case: irrational expectations
A special case of the analysis presented above arises if students have irrational ex-
pectations in the sense that they believe that (i) they are allowed to stay in the host
country for sure and (ii) they will in no case change their mind with respect to the
valuation of the foreign lifestyle to be enjoyed when staying in the host country. In
other words, in their ﬁrst-round (student-) migration decision, they mistake proba-
bilities p and x in that they take p = x = 1 for granted. In that case, the demand
for education in the rich country is
S
IR = 1 −
[v − vH + f/δI]
θ∆v
≥ S (14)












Since the irrationality of students eﬀectively implies higher country-speciﬁc prefer-
ences for the DC (from an ex ante perspective) and therefore also a lower sensitivity
of the number of foreign students to a marginal increase in tuition fees, unsurpris-
ingly fIR exceeds the tuition fee f from the main section above if the actual stay
rate px is smaller than one. The comparative-statics eﬀects with respect to the stay
rate of foreign students are unambiguous:
Proposition 2 With students having irrational expectations in the sense that they
wrongly believe that they can stay in the foreign host country of education (DC) for
sure and that their positive perception of the western lifestyle will not change once
they really became acquainted with living abroad, non-resident tuition fees in the DC
will unambiguously increase with a declining stay rate of foreign students.













Non-resident tuition fees increase with a declining stay rate of foreign students. The
reason is of course that a behavioral eﬀect as presented in section 3.2 does not exist
due to the irrationality of students. The remaining revenue eﬀect then explains the
increase in tuition fees.
This special case of irrational students serves as an important benchmark to
the model with students who have realistic expectations about the chances and the
preferences for a life spent in the DC after being educated there. Depending on the
perception of students’ decision making against the background of these two (polar)
cases, a change in student return-migration might aﬀect non-resident tuition fees
raised in the host country in a directly opposed way.
17Given the benchmark case of students having irrational expectations, the com-
























4 Discussion and extension
This section brieﬂy challenges the monopoly assumption in the main part of the
paper and analyzes whether results still hold for alternative market forms (4.1)
and takes into account a further group of international students, namely those who
want to study abroad but intend to return to their home country immediately upon
graduation (4.2).
4.1 Competition for students in an oligopoly
The two-country setting which is used in sections 2 and 3 in order to illustrate
how non-resident tuition fees in a DC, which is a monopolist in higher education,
depend on the return-migration behavior of foreign students from LDC’s is of course
highly stylized. Given the fact that a handful of DC’s actually host a majority of
international students, one can argue that an oligopoly has to be the object of
investigation capturing the fact that some large players are competing for the pool
of potentially international students. Therefore, this section brieﬂy discusses tuition-
fee competition in a duopoly setting. When it comes to the evaluation of a change
in the return-migration behavior of foreign students upon graduation on equilibrium
tuition fees, the players’ market power is shown to determine whether a behavioral
eﬀect as described earlier exists and therefore how tuition fees are ﬁnally adjusted.
18Suppose ﬁrst of all two identical countries (denoted by 1 and 2) which compete
in a classical Bertrand set-up: both countries oﬀer identical higher education and
maximize net-beneﬁts from educating foreign students over non-resident tuition fees,
which are chosen in both countries simultaneously. Students from the LDC do not
have any country-speciﬁc preferences with respect to DC 1 or 2, so that the demand





     
     
SB(fi,p,x) if fi < f−i
1
2SB(fi,p,x) if fi = f−i
0 if fi > f−i.
(20)
In the (unique) Nash equilibrium (f∗
1,f∗
2), both countries set their tuition fees equal









Each country faces an inﬁnitely elastic demand curve given the tuition fees charged
by the other country, and therefore, the game ﬁnally induces the perfectly com-
petitive outcome. In the pure Bertrand case with intensive price competition, the
behavioral eﬀect of a change in foreign students’ return-migration behavior on the
ﬁrst-round demand for an education abroad does not play any role for the adjust-
ment of equilibrium fees: a decrease in stay rates, which is either induced by a decline
in p or x, increases equilibrium tuition fees unambiguously, i.e. df∗/dp,df∗/dx < 0.
The more students return to their home countries upon graduation, the less ﬁerce
becomes competition in DC’s for these students and therefore the higher equilibrium
tuition fees.
Things change, however, if students are assumed to perceive some diﬀerence
among the higher-education systems in the two countries. In contrast to the standard
Bertrand game, the two host countries of foreign students now have some market
power due to product diﬀerentiation. I will not specify the product diﬀerentiation
any further because my focus is ﬁnally on the eﬀect of stay rates of foreign students
on equilibrium tuition fees. Beside diﬀerences within the higher-education system
19itself, you could for example also think of spatial models of education diﬀerentiation
in which LDC-students diﬀer in their relative distance (e.g., in the sense of geographic
and/or cultural distance) to one of the two DC’s.
Country i then faces a demand of foreign students represented by a contin-
uous function SPD
i (fi,f−i,p,x) (note that the demand function SB
i (fi,f−i) was
discontinuous at fi = f−i) with ∂SPD
i /∂fi < 0 and ∂SPD
i /∂f−i > 0. Each coun-









Country i’s best-response function b(f−i) is then implicitly determined by
S
PD
i (fi,f−i,p,x) + (π






In complete analogy to the monopoly setting, the behavioral eﬀect now comes again
into play when analyzing a decline in students’ stay rates. I will focus here on a
decline in p. The analysis for a decreasing x is in full analogy. For given f−i, the
optimal tuition fee fi either increases or decreases in p, depending on the strength
of the behavioral eﬀect:
dfi
dp






















where Γ := 2(∂SPD
i /∂fi) + (πc + fi + δGpxπg)(∂2SPD
i /∂f2
i ) has to be negative from
the second order condition. For ∂SPD
i /∂p,∂2SPD
i /(∂f∂p) > 0 as in the main section
of the paper, the behavioral eﬀect (term in squared brackets) opposes the more
standard eﬀect through the reduced marginal cost of deterring students away by
rising tuition fees when p decreases. Hence, the equilibrium fee f∗ either decreases
when p decreases (this is the case when the behavioral eﬀect is dominant; see the
stylized diagram (a) in ﬁgure 2) or increases (this is the case when the behavioral
eﬀect is oﬀset; see diagram (b) in ﬁgure 2).
Therefore the main result in section 3 derived from a monopoly setting still holds
if countries are assumed to oﬀer some diﬀerentiated higher education and therefore
eﬀectively have some market power.
20Figure 2: Bertrand competition with diﬀerentiated education; p0 < p
4.2 The composition of the pool of international students
The analysis so far focused on a special sub-group of real-life foreign students, namely
those who ex ante intend to stay in the host country upon graduation (given that
their expectations about foreign lifestyle are fulﬁlled). One might call this group IS-
students (for ‘intend to stay’). Another group that can be of interest is those students
who want to study abroad in order to increase career chances and the individual
living standard within their home country after return and actually never intended
to stay on in the host country (one might call them MA-students for ‘mission-
accomplished’ because they intend to return immediately after graduation).
Taking this latter group into account, a decline in the stay rates of foreign stu-
dents can also be caused by a shift in the composition of foreign students from less
IS-students to more MA-students. The MA-students are assumed to return for sure
in case they decide to study abroad. The number of MA-students actually going
for education in the DC depends negatively on tuition fees. In order to study the
composition eﬀect, assume that a fraction n ∈ (0,1) of the whole foreign student
body who potentially studies in the DC is of the MA-type and the fraction (1−n) of
the IS-type. The DC has no information on the individual types, but only knows the
21composition of the student body, i.e. n. The total demand for the foreign education
system then is
S(f) = nS
MA(f) + (1 − n)S
IS(f), (24)
where SMA and SIS are the numbers of students from each group actually studying
abroad.
I will not present a speciﬁc migration model here, but derive an implicit solution




c + f)S(f) + δGpxπ
g(1 − n)S
IS(f)
s.t. S(f) = nS
MA(f) + (1 − n)S
IS(f). (25)












See that an increase in n implies a decline in the stay rate of foreign students due
























where Ω := 2(∂S/∂f)+(πc +f)(∂2S/∂f2)+δGpxπg(∂2SIS/∂f2) has to be negative
from the second order condition.
According to (27), the overall eﬀect can be decomposed in three components.
First of all, the diﬀerences in sensitivities of demand for education abroad to a
marginal increase in tuition fees between the two subgroups matters. If the demand
from the MA-group, for example, reacts less strongly on a change in tuition fee
policy than the demand from the IS-group (i.e. |∂SMA/∂f| < |∂SIS/∂f|) and if
tuition fees fall short of education costs per students (i.e. πc+f < 0 so that the host
country incurs a loss per student from training international students during the
education period), a shift in the overall demand from IS-students to MA-students –
ceteris paribus – represents an incentive to cutback tuition fees. If the demand from
22the IS-group however is less sensitive, or tuition fees per student exceed costs per
student, there is an incentive to increase tuition fees. This eﬀect is represented by
the ﬁrst term within the squared brackets.
Second, the demand for education abroad within the two subgroups plays a role.
If for example always more individuals from within the IS-group go for education in
the DC than individuals from within the MA-group, a shift towards a larger MA-
group and therefore a smaller IS-group (i.e. a higher n, implying a higher overall
return rate of foreign students) – ceteris paribus – means a reduced marginal revenue
from raising tuition fees, so that there is an incentive to cutback fees. This eﬀect is
represented by the second term within the squared brackets.
Finally, the third term within the squared brackets represents – ceteris paribus
– an incentive to increase tuition fees if the stay rate of graduates (caused by an
increase in n) declines. The reason is that a shift in the composition of foreign stu-
dents towards MA-types eﬀectively reduces the marginal cost of raising fees caused
by the fees’ negative eﬀect on the demand from the IS-group and the related loss of
post-education beneﬁts to the host country.
Overall, without any further speciﬁcations of the migration behavior of students,
the sign of df/dn is ambiguous. The development of a model which explicitly derives
the migration decision of MA-students and relates that to the migration behavior of
IS-students is left for further research.
5 Conclusion
The present paper started from the observed increasing relevance of international
student mobility and the very fact that part of the international students intend to
stay in the host country of education after graduation, which is probably especially
true for students from LDC’s who go for higher education in an OECD country (DC).
Host countries therefore can generally beneﬁt from educating foreign students be-
yond the pure period of education. When the choice of tuition fees for international
23students in the host country considers these beneﬁts, those fees will also depend on
the stay rate of students upon graduation. The paper argues that for changing stay
rates, the host country has not only to consider the direct eﬀect on the expected
beneﬁts from retaining foreign students as high-skilled human capital, but also a
behavioral eﬀect which reﬂects the adjustment of student-migration behavior. Ra-
tional students are aware of the fact that they might return to their home countries
after being educated abroad even if they initially intended to stay in the host coun-
try in order to be employed there, for further research or for launching a business.
While the reasons for return can be manifold, the main part of the paper focusses
on scenarios where (i) students return as graduates because they are ‘forced’ to do
so (no matter what their actual preferences are) or (ii) because once staying abroad
they realize that their positive expectations about the lifestyle abroad did not come
true. At the time when deciding whether to study abroad, students can only build
expectations about whether they might return for one of these reasons although they
ex ante intend to stay in the host country. If students’ perception of these events
to occur in the future changes, their expected beneﬁts from studying abroad and
therefore their ﬁrst-round location decision is altered. The optimal adjustment of
tuition fees in the host country, ﬁnally, has to consider both the direct eﬀect of a
change in the stay rate of foreign students and the behavioral eﬀect which alters the
demand for its education system and which is directly opposed to the direct eﬀect. If
the cost of education per student is not too high, the behavioral eﬀect is dominant,
so that a decline in stay rates of students in the host country induces a cutback in
non-resident tuition fees.
According to Gmelch (1980), return migrants can be assigned to one of three
broader categories: (i) those who intended to stay but are forced to return, (ii) those
who intended to stay but choose to return and (iii) those who only intended tem-
porary migration and return once they have achieved their objectives abroad. The
migration model in the main part of the paper captured the ﬁrst two categories. The
extension in section 4.2 also considers returning graduates from the third category.
Therein I analyzed a scenario where a decline in stay rates is caused by a shift in the
24composition of the group of potential foreign students from those who intend to stay
abroad after graduation to those who intend to return promptly after ‘accomplishing
their mission’.
There are several aspects which are closely related to the issues analyzed in the
present paper and which deserve more attention in future research. While the model
treated the cause of return migration as exogenous, the host country could generally
also try to actively inﬂuence the stay rates of foreign students upon graduation.
This can include immigration legislation, eﬀorts to integrate foreign students into
the domestic society and to reduce their risk of failure to adapt, the provision of
country-speciﬁc human capital and measures to facilitate national labor market ac-
cess, just to name a few examples. The supposed positive impact on stay rates from
which the host country could beneﬁt, then has to be contrasted with the cost of
introducing/extending these policies, which probably not only means resource costs
but also political costs.
Further issues arise once also taking the source countries’ perspective into ac-
count and recognizing that DC’s might not only maximize ‘proﬁts’ from educating
foreign students, but could also be committed to foreign-aid aspects of training in-
ternational students, thereby considering explicitly the utility of students as well
as the source countries’ welfare. Furthermore, the present analysis also ignores the
source country as an active ‘player’ in the competition for high-skilled human capital:
LDC’s can in fact apply various policies to retain students or rather to promote their
repatriation as graduates in case they went for education abroad (see for example
Gribble (2008) for an overview of policy options employed by sending countries ex-
periencing some signiﬁcant student outﬂow) so that DC’s and LDC’s actually could
interact strategically, both using quite diﬀerent policies.
25Appendix
The proof of Proposition 1 uses the constraint that the optimal tuition fee f is
supposed to imply an interior solution with respect to the foreign demand for the
education system in the DC. The constraint that the exogenous parameters in the
model have to ensure that S(f = argmaxΠ(f)) is strictly smaller than one (i.e. not
the entire pool of potential international students ends up in the DC) can be written
as
δIθx(2p − 1)∆v − δGpxπ
g > δI(v
H − v) + π
c, (28)
where I used the optimal tuition fee as of (11) in the demand function S(f,·) as given
by (8). This constraint directly shows that if the right hand sight of the inequality
is positive, the left hand sight has to be positive as well, i.e. δI(vH − v) + πc > 0
implies δIθx(2p − 1)∆v − δGpxπg > 0, the latter ﬁnally implying df/dx > 0 as can
be seen from (13). This proves the ﬁrst part of the proposition. The second part,
namely df/dp > 0, can be proved as follows: see that δIθx(2p − 1)∆v − δGpxπg > 0

















2θ∆v from our assumption on the range of p (namely
p > 1/2), ensures that (30) also automatically holds when (29) is fulﬁlled, thereby
proving that df/dp > 0.
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